

KATHARINA BRECKNER

RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHERS ON CONTINUOUS CREATION AS THE BASIS FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

ABSTRACT. Vladimir Solov'ëv, Sergej Bulgakov, Nikolaj Berdjaev, and Semën Frank shared the conviction that Creation is incomplete: humanity must arrive at organizing social life on an "eighth day." Thus they prophesied the Universal Church, "social Christianity," "personalist socialism," and "spiritual democracy." Their attempt to avoid any illegitimate confusion between independent rational thought and Christian faith prompted Bulgakov to become an ordained theologian, Berdjaev a "philosophical poet," and Frank a "Christian realist." Solov'ëv's theosophical attempt to philosophically substantiate faith and consequently eschatological prophecy finds itself in the same tragic predicament as Christian faith in general when amalgamated on a one to one basis with the world. I am to show that this is not the case for any of the three other authors discussed, however, much they did adhere to some of Solov'ëv's major lines of thought.

KEY WORDS: myth, Nikolaj Berdjaev, ontology of service, prophecy, religious materialism, Semën Frank, Sergej Bulgakov, social Christianity, Trinitarian ontology, Vladimir Solov'ëv

INTRODUCTION

This article offers a brief *tour de frappe* through the oeuvres of four important Russian religious philosophers: Vladimir S. Solov'ëv (1853–1900), Sergej N. Bulgakov (1871–1944), Nikolaj A. Berdjaev (1874–1948), and Semën L. Frank (1877–1950). The confidence in Creation continued by mankind is, I argue, what held together "Silver Age" thought' as it developed in Solov'ëv's wake: these thinkers shared the belief that Creation is incomplete and that *bogočelovečstvo* (humanity following the example of the *bogočelovek*/Jesus Christ) must arrive at organizing social life according to man's God-like creativity,

fulfilling Creation on its *eighth day*.¹ Although this notion is developed into a refined discourse only by Berdjaev and cannot be found in the writings of Solov'ëv, Bulgakov, or Frank, it organizes, I argue, their thought about Creation and man's task as well.

The attempt to develop philosophically what, in essence, is pure faith, runs into a tragic predicament because for a Christian to philosophize means to find oneself – to quote John Caputo – “in the distance between the Jew and the Greek,” to be pulled in “... opposite directions thinking the sober words of the philosophers while being intoxicated by the cries of the prophets, to do two things at once.” (...) “Beginning with the impossible” describes the dynamics of religious life and thought, a life and a thinking that is driven by “... a messianic hope for something impossible, something always to come. The impossible is what is absolutely unforeseeable, what surprises us or shatters our horizon of expectation.”² As I intend to show, Solov'ëv, Bulgakov, Berdjaev, and Frank expound both the possibilities and the boundaries of reason in discussing the coming of the *eighth day*. As Solov'ëv's vision is the most deterministic one, there is no way, to my mind, to liberate it from the imputation of an illegitimate confusion between belief and rational thought.

For all four, the world in itself [*an sich*] is not fathomed by means of cognition but by what I suggest labelling as co-quintessential being, i.e. co-creatorship with the Absolute that is intended here.³ The most explicit on this point is Frank, who reformulates the Cartesian formula *cogito, ergo sum* into *cogito, ergo est esse absolutum* (I think, therefore there is absolute being). The Platonic world of Ideas is replaced by God, Who is not an “object,” but rather the “quintessence of being,” denoting the “living potential of knowledge and consciousness.”⁴ Consequently, the world for itself [*für sich*] equally transcends the oppositions between unity and diversity, between the Absolute and the relative, and between transcendence and immanence. The world as it is perceived rather is a *coincidentia oppositorum* [coincidence of opposites], to use Cusanus' phrase⁵: determinations do not pertain to it

disjunctively, in the form of “either-or,” but *conjunctively*, in the form of “both” the one and the other. This, of course, is not a very original idea; it refers back in particular to the Church Fathers Athanasius of Alexandria, Gregorius of Nicaea, to Neo-Platonists such as Origen, and also to mystics like Jacob Böhme and Meister Eckhart.

This cognitive approach leads to the equation of Christianity with life as it actually is [*für sich*], which is an attempt to amalgamate two basic approaches that cannot be united, since each insists on its own exclusivity or totality. Particularly Solov’ëv’s and Bulgakov’s efforts to give a place to the Unknowable in every aspect of humanity by means of the notion of *Sophia* amount to such a determined attempt. However, Bulgakov’s intellectual “career” comes across as more convincing than Solov’ëv’s, since he mutated from a philosopher to an ordained theologian and therefore cannot be charged with philosophical escapism.

The first section of this article, which is on Solov’ëv and Bulgakov, is organized around the question of how the historical Church and *Sophia* are interrelated. In contrast to both Solov’ëv and Bulgakov, Berdjaev and Frank were well aware of the important problem mentioned above, even though they drew diametrically opposed conclusions from this insight. Two separate sections are dedicated to their solutions of how “world and heaven” co-operate in possibly fulfilling Creation. In the conclusion, I will briefly compare all four thinkers.

SOLOV’ËV AND BULGAKOV ON THE CHURCH AND ON SOCIAL CHRISTIANITY

To my mind, Solov’ëv’s and Bulgakov’s ideas of *Sophia* are intrinsically connected with their concepts of “religious materialism:” as early as 1903 Bulgakov expressed his wish to elaborate an alternative to the Marxian variant of materialism.⁶ Explicitly referring to Solov’ëv’s anti-Marxian concept of “religious materialism” Bulgakov, too, acknowledges matter as a “spiritual body:” if man resurrects, the same must be true for nature as a whole, even though there is a difference in quality.

Logical thought must either deny man's spiritual essence, or admit it for all of nature. Despite the fact that Solov'ëv never developed this concept into a refined, separate philosophical discourse, Bulgakov praised him for having prepared the ground for a magnificent Christian metaphysics by introducing the vibrant idea of nature as the "other God," a "living substantiality," or, the "second Absolute." Here too, this complex of concepts refers back to the patristic fathers named above, but Bulgakov relates this patristic doctrine to Friedrich Schelling's theory of identity:⁷ "Nature must be the visible spirit, and spirit must be the invisible nature."⁸ In Bulgakov, this "identity" denotes the "... profound and intimate kinship of nature and spirit," making "... labor, consumption and production possible as a *subjective-objective* [italics mine, KB] process, as identity *in actu*."⁹ Consequently, *active identity* denotes cognitive processes: nature, the "Second Absolute" becomes humanized and finds itself submitted to man's consciousness, realizing itself in him.

As I share Bulgakov's opinion that we run into a "labyrinth" as far as Solov'ëv's central notion of *Sophia* is concerned,¹⁰ and in light of Tatjana Kochetkova's valuable findings on Solov'ëv's variant of *Sophia*,¹¹ I limit myself to a brief *resumé* of Bulgakov's position. Just like Solov'ëv, he replaces the impersonal Platonic/Aristotelian ontology by a Christian, personified ontology. As far as *Sophia* is concerned, she is made to be correlative to the Greek *ousia*, and Bulgakov ascribes her to each of the three hypostases, respectively. This "three-fold construction" defines the heavenly and the creaturely *Sophia* as signifying one and the same: she, *Sophia*, stands for a "*living principle*," which reaches out in the world characterized as "being hypostatic" [*ipostasnost*].¹² This is the potentiality of someone or something, including nature, to be turned, through human action, into a hypostasis, i.e. to incarnate the Divine substance, *ousia*, in hierarchically organized forms. Those modes and forms are what he calls a "hypostasis," viz. the essential *nature* of a substance as opposed to its attributes. In *Ipostas i ipostasnost'. Scholia k Svetu Nevečernemu* [*Hypostasis and Hypostatization. Scholia to the Unfading Light*] (1924/25),

Bulgakov discusses *Sophia's* modes and forms from the highest in God to the highest on earth, which, of course, is the Church, a point Solov'ëv agrees with.¹³ Bulgakov's *Glavy o Troičnosti* [*Chapters on Trinity*] (1928/30) analytically clarifies the primordial premise of his – as well as of Solov'ëv's – entire thought: God must be perceived as the *absolute subject* and not, as in natural religions, as the *absolute object*.¹⁴ The singular subject is always “threefold:” the individual “I” exists within a triangular relationship, and is a multiplicity of the eternally given “I,” which divides into “I” itself, the “I–you” and the “I-(s)he,” the latter guaranteeing the existence of the “I” and the “you.” The “(s)he” hinders mere doubling of the “I,” hinders isolated, “simple” identification of the “I” with the “you” and ensures the recognition of the “we,” which is threefold by definition. This “we” is the ontological fundament and, as such, basic to all cognition, of the “I” in the first place. The “you” and/or “he” is possibly alien to the “I” after man has fallen, and this can destroy “we.” From a metaphysical point of view, all three units form as much the “I” as they form the “we,” which is the basis of the “I” potentially bridging the distances between them.¹⁵ Man is entirely free to fill the gap between those two parts of his being or not to fill it, i.e. either to fill it by recognizing the latter, working his way through his own empirical “I,” creating it consciously, transforming it to the necessary extent, or not to fill it by giving his unconscious, non-reflected empirical I the prominent, or the absolute place. Bulgakov admits the essence of this “*free act* [italics mine, KB]” to be “... inexplicable for it is non-causal”: the individual's intelligible nature is freedom, which is the same as to say that we are dealing “... with the absolute self-causality of the will.”¹⁶

In Solov'ëv, too, many strands of his thought include the number three. In *Evrejsťvo i khristjanskij vopros* [*The Jews and the Christian Question*, 1884], for example, three forms of “materialism” are distinguished: first, “practical materialism” denotes no more than a crude, egoistic, hedonistic form of life; it is theoretically developed by what has been called “scientific materialism,” which, as the second type, objectifies and prolongs the “practical materialist,” a shallow type of personality

into historical determinism – in which there is no freedom. The third type of materialism, “religious materialism,” describes the Hebrews’ thought and mentality: they did not separate “spirit” from its material appearance. Because “matter” does not have any independent existence, it is neither God nor devil, but rather represents a yet undignified dwelling inhabited by God’s spirit, sanctifying the vessel through man’s co-operation. “Religious materialism” is how Solov’ëv labels this type of spirituality.¹⁷ In *Opravdanie dobra* [*The Justification of the Good*, 1894–97] Solov’ëv reformulates the central point of “religious materialism” using a different terminology: “... to spiritualize nature [*odukhotvorit’ prirodu*]” possibly arises from the ownership of a piece of land and it signifies an extremely important foundation for the moral organization of material and social life. The use of nature on behalf of survival is not what is meant, rather we are to consider nature’s transfiguration, its being modeled by man’s hands seen as part of the creative process, as participation in Divine Creation:¹⁸ Creation is a continuous process depending upon “integral knowledge.”

The Solov’ëvian cognitive principle requires a synthesis of human consciousness in three states, namely “sensual, rational, and religious (or mystical) experience,” equal importance being imparted to each of them.¹⁹ This threefold epistemological concept corresponds to man’s “trintarian” nature: simultaneously, he is a “king,” a “priest,” and last but not least a “prophet.”²⁰ As must be concluded, each person relies on one and the same triple nature of cognition, bringing forth three types of human acts: first, there are things already done and beyond alteration, secondly, acts performed out of present needs, and, third, acts resulting from aspirations for an ideal state of things.²¹ The number three reappears also when the cosmic order is discussed: the “moon” lightens the dark, the “sun” illumines the day, and “stars” brightly shine the way once moon and sun are hidden for one reason or another.²² The Solov’ëvian notion of All-unity [*vseedinstvo*] takes Trinity as a cosmic concept: it is no surprise that ideal society, i.e. the universal Church – *Sophia*’s highest incarnation – has a threefold structure, too. It is crowned by a “pope” who heads an

“assembly of bishops,” and it has another large “assembly of priests” at the basis.²³ For the sake of “wholeness” of the personality and the World, the Church performs the ministries of a “priest,” a “king,” and last but not least that of a “prophet,” just in the way each individual at his best is God’s *priest*, *king* of the inferior world, and *prophet* of the future reunion of the inferior and the superior worlds. The priest’s ministry is based on traditional knowledge of the “mystery,” while the royal function of the Church should be displayed by support of Christian politics by “Christian tsars” at times present.²⁴ The question arises what the indigenous place of prophets would be: it is important to bear in mind that the “prophetic ministry” performed by the Church is also given to everyone within the clerical body as well as to everybody in general, irrespective of faith. In this precise respect every Christian has “exactly the same rights as the pope or the tsar,”²⁵ a demand that corresponds to secular freedom of speech.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that the Church’s natural allies either are prophets within the three ranks of the Church itself, or beyond, viz. singular personalities that may promote progress advancing the historical process on its lengthy “seventh historical day” until the universal Church takes over the world’s rule. The Augustinian scheme is modified by Solov’ëv,²⁶ for whom the “sixth historical day” lasted from the time of the “second temple” to the arrival of Jesus Christ, an event that, as I conclude by continuing Solov’ëv’s counting, starts the “seventh day.” This decisive day is characterized by man’s participation in the creational process. This is the crucial point of his notion of Godmanhood (*bogočlovečestvo*): in *Istorija i budućnost’ teokratii* [History and future of theocracy, 1887], Solov’ëv divides history into seven “historical days” which correspond to the seven Biblical days.²⁷ We thus arrive at a scheme where an “eighth day” would have to be added if one included the *end* of this world and the coming of the second, i.e. final Kingdom of God. When counting in epochs instead of “historical days,” the world’s first epoch was characterized by a series of messianic anticipations, the second was covered by Christ’s life on earth, while the third was started by His

crucifixion; this epoch has not ended yet, Christianity having opened the doors to the discovery of Godmanhood.²⁸ Only when the world's transformation, the prospective arrival at what Solov'ëv called *vseedinstvo* [All-unity], i.e. the establishment of the Universal Church as the "objective" reality of God's Kingdom, will be complete,²⁹ the "seventh historical day" will reach its dawn and the eight day as well as a fourth epoch beyond time and space will begin.

Recalling St. Augustine's distinction between *civitas Dei* and *civitas terrena*, Solov'ëv redefines the Church, for it is through the ministry of the prophecy that the Church necessarily partakes in both cities. Every Christian, and in fact everybody, is a prophet in potential terms. The Church is thus situated, in secular terms, in both the private and the public spheres, or in between the two Augustinian cities. In present-day language, we could say that the various historical Churches are among the constituent parts of civil society by deepening their communicative action into the private sphere, exploring what can be objectified by means of language or other standards, and seeking to enrich itself by the deciphered mystical knowledge. The Church should mediate this knowledge to inner innovation; this is what "religious politics" is about in Solov'ëv. "Christian politics" in turn must implement the newly won insights within the institutional public sphere; there is a long way to go until *Sophia's* highest incarnation, the establishment of the Universal Church, will complete Creation.

By contrast, Bulgakov's answer to the question of how the historical Church and *Sophia* are interrelated is of a 'simple' theological character: the Sacrament of the Eucharist is declared an active-passive event that reunites *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, and the identity of the two is *Sophia*.³⁰ This reunion is achieved by labor, namely cognition of the uncreated and the Created, by consumption, namely the consumption of the Created, and by production, namely the creation of new realities, which may realize the world's hypostatic potential. Bulgakov's prophecy of "social Christianity" belongs to the same discursive context: a *tour d'horizon* from his early works as a philosopher up to his later works as a theologian shows

that Bulgakov repeatedly quotes Nikolaj Fëdorov's *Philosophy of the Common Task* [*Filosofija obščego dela*].³¹ In his *Social Teaching in Modern Russian Orthodox Theology* (1934) "social Christianity" is defined as having already been Fëdorov's central issue, for "... Christianity must be social, must become common work ...," presuming the "... change of the whole economic, social, and industrial organization of society."³² However, this "prophetic future" is envisioned only for "... social Christianity," i.e. for "... the Church." The Church is both uncreated and Created; she is the world's "... real foundation and aim, its entelechy" and therefore is confronted with similar tasks as is man: it receives "*social, historical*" in addition to "*cosmic significance* [*italics mine, KB*]." The Church's tasks include not only providing ways to personal salvation but also the *transfiguration of the world*, including obviously the history of mankind, which is the history of the Church, not "... only in the sacramental, mystical life, *but in the prophetic spirit, as a call to new activity, to new tasks, to new achievements* [*italics mine, KB*]." ³³ In my reading of Bulgakov's works his answer on how this could happen is as follows: communion initiates communication, and communicative ends are inherent to the sacrament of the Eucharist, bearing a "practical character" by definition.³⁴ This sacrament enhances, as he claims, creative use of labor, consumption, and production, herewith spiritually (re-)uniting *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, viz. resurrecting dead matter.

CONTINUOUS CREATION IN BERDJAEV

Marie-Madeleine Davy, in her commentary, has called Berdjaev a man who himself was a sort of symbol of the "eighth day," and who answered the question whether he considered himself a "fool in God [*jurodivyy*]" by saying that he indeed believed himself to belong to this breed of Russians.³⁵ In fact, it has often been said that Berdjaev was less significant as a philosopher than as a prophet.³⁶ Inspired by Solov'ëv's and Bulgakov's notion of Godmanhood,³⁷ Berdjaev supplemented its basic idea with another "myth," namely the "*theandric*

myth,” symbolizing man’s God-like creative potential. Man is a not merely a microcosm, he is also a “microtheos:” Creator and the microcosm man are intertwined by God’s emanation of Spirit, a creative energy that transfigures the world.³⁸ All great and seminal events in history are personal to begin with: they are born in existential time before appearing in historical time, undergoing alienation.³⁹ Berdjaev’s variant of existentialism and his “theandric myth” recovers Jacob Böhme’s *Ungrund*-myth, namely the idea that freedom is prior to being. Freedom is of a noumenal nature, for it entails personal experience of eternity.

This idea is recovered when Berdjaev discusses breakthroughs of the Spirit into existential time as unmeasurable, subjective by definition. Samuel Calian elucidates Berdiaev’s agreement with the New-Testament *kairos* as understood by Paul Tillich, viz. the influx of eternity into time.⁴⁰ In this “moment,” which I would like to call “eternity-in-time,” personality is born: “Man’s countenance is the most touching thing in the world,” as Berdjaev summarises the spiritual struggle that accompanies the creation of one’s own personality prior to any other form of creativity.⁴¹ Again, we are talking about a “myth,”⁴² for this process lies beyond objectification: “The working out of personality is the working out of an aristocratic type, that is to say of the man who does not allow himself to be blended with his impersonal world environment.”⁴³ This type of “free” person, ready for “self-sacrifice” and “magnanimity” may organize himself in groups such as a “clerical caste,” a “hierarchy of princes of the Church,” a caste in “... the proper sense of nobility of family,” or an “aristocratic selection within a class which is not aristocratic.”⁴⁴ There is no analogy to Friedrich Nietzsche’s *Übermensch*, for “the aristocratic breed of men is extraordinarily sensitive and suffers much.” Berdjaev would certainly disagree with Sergej Trubeckoj, who defined the Church as the exclusive transmitter of “metaphysically social” knowledge,⁴⁵ but he would just as certainly agree with him in giving “*sobornal* cognition,” i.e. cognition won in and by communal action, a prominent place.⁴⁶ His later writings reflect his deep sorrow that European

societies have ended in a “proletarian status:” impersonal masses socially determine modernity and the masses – the “plebs” whose “bourgeois” members lack inner “aristocracy” – dominate social life. Egoism sets political paradigms. Parliamentary democracy comes down to a farce, merely serving the welfare of diverse “perverted” interest groups. Modernity is a soulless “organized chaos.”⁴⁷

What in Marx is alienation [*Entfremdung*] and reification [*Verdinglichung*],⁴⁸ becomes, in Berdjajev’s sociology, a differentiation between spiritual bourgeoisie, plebs, and spiritual aristocracy, as well as his concept of objectification: society is under the sway of determinism and objectification. Berdjajev was far from presenting any kind of teleology: his assumption that spiritual liberation would “... have immediate social and political implications”⁴⁹ cannot be explained on any other basis but personal confidence. Liberation, for Berdjajev, demands personal struggle, hinging on the acknowledgment of noumenal freedom. Man’s personal creative task to become an aristocrat is hindered by all kinds of standards, including language and other forms of expression. This is why Berdjajev’s own notions of anarchy and/or God’s Kingdom are cautiously presented as spiritual, subjective-objective, existential categories impossible to describe by any other category than eternity flowing in time. In fact, his proposals concerning the contents of the Kingdom of God and of “personalist socialism” are strikingly similar. Theocracy is an organic social order where people cease to struggle with one other. A theocratic union is not a formal, but a real union, in its form and content are one.⁵⁰ As far as “personalist socialism” is concerned, it signifies a “spiritually joined federation,” a federation of loosely associated “fraternal units.”⁵¹ In my view, there is little difference between the two conceptions, except for their time-dimensions. While the first is as much an eschatological dimension as it is existentialist in character, another aspect of “eternity in-time,” the second comes down to a hope for a general Christian renaissance, as it were, bringing forth *spiritual* – “metaphysically social”⁵² – societies. I take Berdjajev’s late writing *Sud’ba čeloveka v sovremennom mire* [*Man’s Destiny in the Present World* (1934)], as

his testament: it unambiguously testifies to his total disillusion, which did not prevent him from mentioning his hope for fulfillment on the “*eighth day*,” based on his extraordinary concept of “theandric existentialism.”⁵³

CREATION IN FRANK

Frank’s social philosophy as presented in *Spiritual Foundations of Society* [*Dukhovnye osnovy obščestva*, 1929] – for Frank this falls within the province of the variant of a phenomenology of spirit⁵⁴ – summarizes his early schemes for a philosophical psychology and blurs the borderlines between ontology and phenomenology by means of the principle of *service*, signifying an ‘impersonal-personal’ will: the human soul for itself [*für sich*] does not bear the property of being, for the soul needs to be revealed to itself. This revelation is both the soul’s immanent revelation to itself and the revelation of the Spirit’s transcendent reality. Philosophical psychology “grasps” the unknowable in acknowledging the transcendent–immanent relation between spirit and soul, which is why Spirit belongs to the realm of psychological phenomena; consequently, phenomena, in turn, mirror “eternal” ideas matching the soul’s *intentional gaze* at phenomena.⁵⁵ In another terminology, Frank discusses modes and forms of “eidetic” recognition of the self.⁵⁶

Frank agrees with Bergson that the soul’s activity is never fragmentized into parts and the activity in turn is born out of “*creativity*.”⁵⁷ Spirit denotes *élan vital*: it is “... not anything ready-made, not “substance” (...) creative life is not its [the spirit’s, KB] property, state or attribute, but its very essence; the conceptions of life and of living, of creativeness and the creator coincide.”⁵⁸ Man is not only a “*servant*” of an higher will,⁵⁹ but also, and simultaneously a “co-partner in God’s creativeness.”⁶⁰ As we learn in Frank’s *Metaphysics of the Soul* [*Metaphysik der Seele*, 1929]; the soul’s ontology is bound to the ontology of community; to be more precise, in isolation from the second, the first is impossible to design, which is why social philosophy accommodates both.⁶¹ Man’s individual “deification” thus corresponds to the “ultimate goal of social

life,” because it signifies “*the realization of life itself*,”⁶² corresponding to reality’s ontological nature: “In addition to being non-material, social being is supra-individual and supra-personal and thereby differs from psychic being. We shall call this objective non-material being an “idea.”.. in the sense of the spiritual (but not psychic) objective content of being.”⁶³ Consequently, these “ideas” must not be confused with regulative, abstract ideas in the Kantian sense. In Frank, ideas bear “telological force” and they act upon human consciousness, namely “upon the will in the form of that which *should be*.”⁶⁴ “The *obligatory* is a primordial category which expresses the subordination of human will to a higher, ideal, absolutely obligatory principle” – it arises out of the Divine-human nature of social life and is “always present in the form of law and power.”⁶⁵

However, since Cusanus’ formula of “coincidence of opposites” wholly determines Frank’s cognitive method,⁶⁶ its logic spins threads through the depths of Frank’s socio-political conceptualization. For him, all-unity boils down to the following formula: “the ‘*invisible church*’ (...) forms the enigmatic essence of the living organism,”⁶⁷ or in another wording, “*every society is necessarily grounded in the church* as the nucleus and life-giving principle of society.”⁶⁸ This is why “Hegel’s definition of the state as an “earthly god” was completely right, although his “*pantheistic* [italics mine, KB] identification of the divine with the human” is “incorrect.”⁶⁹ There is by no means identity, but yet another “coincidence of opposites,” for, again, “... the ‘ideal’ and the ‘empirically real’ in social life do not oppose each other as two concretely separate loci of power, they are inseparably fused.”⁷⁰

Not surprisingly, the ideal type of government is of dual character, too, combining the “mystical supra-temporal unity of society with the action and interests and demands of the present day, with free social self-determination.”⁷¹ What we have to deal with at this point is the duality of *sobornost’* and *obščestvennost’*, boiled down to the following. The existence of the ‘thou’ signifies the existence of an “impersonal personal” reality which denotes the unity of the “we,” and this experience

is bound to “transcendent immanence,” to “real transcending”⁷² which is why this unity is “... revealed in a concrete-living way only in the phenomenon of love.”⁷³ Also, “... it may be said that the *potency of love* is the very essence of human life.”⁷⁴ Thus, *sobornost*’ lies at the base of society and is an expression of “... *love* as the action of inner supra-natural Divine truth which overcomes empirical nature.”⁷⁵ *Obsčestvennost*’ denotes the entire system of human unifications and social institutions and/or organizations⁷⁶ ontologically founded on *sobornost*.⁷⁷ “Social life [*obsčestvennost*’, KB] is the outer expression or incarnation of *spiritual* life.”⁷⁸

Frank hints at “ontologically true politics,”⁷⁹ entailing distinct ways and means of government. “Ontologically true politics” aim at a “politics of *spiritually free conservatism*,” simultaneously comprising a “politics of innovation.”⁸⁰ Certainly, Frank would have agreed with Karl Popper’s famous notion of the open society, and yet, he would have added that accessibility and transparency, be it spiritual or social, emanate “... from the principle of the *universality of service*.”⁸¹ The “true ontological meaning and the true source of *democracy* (...) is not *the rule of all*, but *the service of all* (...) the only primordial right of every man is his *right to participate in the common service*.”⁸² In times no longer providing the religious legitimacy for constitutional monarchical power, ideally guaranteeing “*faithfulness to the past* [italics mine, KB],”⁸³ democracy, according to Frank, best allows the implementation of Christian politics. In 1929, he pointed at the American presidential democracy as realizing optimally, on the one hand, the “conservation of the continuity of social being” and, on the other hand, “free social self-determination.”⁸⁴ As his writings do not address either social or political decision procedures, but rather offer an ontology of principles, Frank’s social philosophy amounts to implicitly differentiating “spiritual democracy”⁸⁵ from democracy as such, in total disregard of its diverse forms such as “popular,” “liberal,” “social,” or “participatory democracy.”⁸⁶

One of Frank’s early, unrealized plans was to compose a “trilogy” combining his epistemology, as elaborated in *Predmet*

znaniya [*The Object of Knowledge*], (1915), his ontology of the human soul, as presented in *Duša človeka; Opyt vvedenija v filozofskuju psikhologiju* [*The Human Soul. Attempt at an Introduction to Philosophical Psychology*], (1917), and his social philosophy, introduced in *Dukhovnye osnovy obščestva*.⁸⁷ Had Frank succeeded in writing this trilogy, combining his cognitive approach with the ontology of the soul's life and the ontology of community, leading the way to social philosophy,⁸⁸ he certainly would have reiterated his early vision of "spiritual democracy." Logically, the notion of service would have become its credo: as the "ultimate source of social unity lies in the principle of service," ideally, the Church, namely the "soul" of the world, is to represent "the sense of the obligatory, of the normative consciousness."⁸⁹

Frank neither discusses the different possible meanings and concepts of the "visible" Church, nor the political problem of the relationship between Church and State. His "Christian realism"⁹⁰ went as far as acknowledging the legitimacy of the Church's total retreat from worldly affairs: Frank justifies the early Church's rejection of the world as having been due partly "... to its faith in the imminent end of the world, which made inessential all work toward the improvement of the early structure of life."⁹¹ He was highly suspicious of the existing Christian Churches: in a letter dated 1947 he complained that they neither represented the "*corpus mysticum*" nor the "*ecclesia militans*" that were needed.⁹² About 20 years earlier Frank had already expressed his fear that all "... attempts at the external, artificial, mechanical organizational absorption of the world by the church are not only destined to fail, but lead to a result contrary to their goal: namely to the secularization ... of the church."⁹³

Dismissing the idea of "inevitable progress in history," and denying all ideas of a "kingdom of Man on earth,"⁹⁴ Frank apprehends history soberly as "*the process of the education of mankind*."⁹⁵ Even though he enthrones the "*moral education of the individual*," labeling it the "royal road of the genuine Christian perfecting of life,"⁹⁶ he does not discuss any of its particulars: from his point of view, the task to accumulate

human powers “as tools that serve the good”⁹⁷ is not only self-evident, but all its achievements necessarily flow into the world.⁹⁸ Education takes part in Christian politics, entailing “*Christianization of life*” moving “*from inside outward*” and rejecting “*all political and social fanaticism.*”⁹⁹ Frank defended a “Christian realism,” based on the “principle of the concrete effectiveness of our moral activity.”¹⁰⁰ This “Christian realism” is, in fact, “a kind of anti-utopianism”¹⁰¹ that characterizes his entire thought. Since there is no dogmatic, fixed concept of a “*Christian order of life*”¹⁰² and because Christian politics demands to “*creatively Christianize* the general conditions of life,”¹⁰³ there are only cautious outlines of a relatively best order. They draw on Frank’s ontological assertion that power and hierarchy, law, order, and conservatism must necessarily be united with spontaneous innovation, i.e. the individual’s creativity: ontologically, the intertwining of both is predetermined by the prior notion of service. This is why democracy, which is historically rooted in the *proclamation of human rights*, would, I venture, need an amendatory *declaration of human duties* in order to meet Frank’s “ontology of service.”

CONCLUSION

In Solov’ëv’s and Bulgakov’s prophecies of an *église universelle* and a *social Christianity*, in Berdiaev’s hope for an *eighth day of Creation*, and in Frank’s *Christian realism*, there surely is no such thing as a moral or any other type of ideology. Ideology designates an action-orientated, an intentional programmatic concept, coordinating, as it were, human consciousness and environmental circumstances, postulating an organic link between both in view of the desired future status: the ethical social program is based on moral calculations, i.e. presupposes intrinsic values in the environment which supposedly give birth to a specified type of social action evidently bound to a particular type of morality.¹⁰⁴ The rejection of “intentional” and/or “conceptual competition” is, in principle, one of the key signs of ideological commitment, for the ideal picture of the present and/or the future is declared to be absolutely

relevant;¹⁰⁵ voluntarism thus is excluded. In this sense, it does not make any difference whether this ideal picture or conception is of religious origin or otherwise.

This definitely is not the case in any of the conceptualizations discussed in this paper: apart from Solov'ëv we are not dealing with ideal pictures at all. We rather have to do with "vague visions" correlating to fundamental Christian faith. I radically disagree with Frank, who maintained that reason constitutes philosophy, i.e. generates knowledge no matter whether it springs from the impersonal or the personified Christian *logos*.¹⁰⁶ Also, I do not follow Solov'ëv in asserting that philosophy discursively grasps being through a "*system of all-embracing knowledge [tsel'nogo znaniija]*" and that knowledge has the appearance of personal "*belief,*" objectified and herewith legitimized by rational, logical and systematic thought.¹⁰⁷ Objectifications of belief by rational, systematic, metaphysical arguments lead to a denser quality of belief, but they surely do not legitimize faith, which relies on revelation.

As I see it, Frank, Berdjaev, and Bulgakov avoided any illegitimate confusion of independent rational thought and Christian faith. Frank followed Cusanus' motto "*atingitur inatingibile inatingibiliter*" holding that philosophy is the rational transcendence of the limitations of rational thought.¹⁰⁸ Following this motto, Frank's notion of service blurs the borders between phenomenology and ontology and arrives at a sort of *realism*: the notion of service is nothing new in the world's history, but it is in parts institutionalized by law already. Why should its scope not be changed in the future, if pressure for change continues to grow?

Berdjaev freely admits that his "philosophical thinking does not take a scientific form (...) its driving power is a passion for freedom;" it is not so much that he arrives at truth as that he took his "start from it [*sic*]." ¹⁰⁹ I am surprised by his "courage" and impressed by his "theandric existentialism" that escapes all ethical, institutional, and historical discussions, for in this work the central blurring concerns the border between eternity and time. His philosophizing relies on nothing but faith in freedom prior to God, in Eternity's might nourishing man's "theandric"

creativity, viz. the freedom to create *ex nihilo*. However this may be, his philosophizing, like Frank's, relies on nothing but the singular individual and his capacity creatively to organize individual and social life. I therefore suggest calling Berdjajev's variant of existentialism "*philosophical poetry*:" His philosophizing does not *escape*, but transcends standard questions such as the eschatological problem. Already his anti-Marxian sociology, differentiating between plebs and aristocrats, like his concept of eternity-in-time, can neither be falsified nor verified; these are vivid arguments, subjective in character, and yet perfectly in line with his concept of noumenal freedom.

Bulgakov, ordained as a priest in 1918, looked henceforth at Creation from a purely theological point of view. He had come to the conviction that the metaphysical meaning of labor, consumption, and production, first introduced in his early *Philosophy of Economy* [*Filosofija khozjajstva*, 1911] cannot be defended philosophically, but only religiously and/or theologically, which makes a significant difference. Even if Christian dogma as such can be regarded as an argument and certainly generates a specific type of rationality, it nevertheless makes a difference whether knowledge and objectification spring from impersonal reason or from the personified Christian *logos*. Bulgakov differs from Frank at this point. The idea of Divine-human co-Creation requires the personified Christian *logos*, or else the notion of creativity does not express man's essence but remains one out of the many of his possible attributes.

Bulgakov clearly understood that his early philosophical attempts would have ended in "philosophical escapism" and consequently switched to the theological faculty: the Eucharist elevated to the highest rank so as to embed co-Creation fits, at least from a lay point of view, Christian dogma. To my mind, Solov'ëv's theosophical attempt philosophically to substantiate his prophecy of ideal society finds itself in the same tragic predicament as Christian belief in general when amalgamated with the world: there is no possibility to legitimize faith by anything else but faith. Frank said that Solov'ëv, the "Russian Plato," had been successful in fulfilling what had been promised yet was never completed by the Slavophiles, for out of the

breadth of Orthodox religiosity he distilled a “universal philosophical worldview.”¹¹⁰ Even if true, I do not see the relevance of this “philosophical success,” for the prophecy of the Universal Church can do without any sort of rational objectification; there are reasons to reflect upon the German saying “do not move the Church from Its place to another” [*lass die Kirche im Dorf*]. Of course, the Trinity, as it is mirrored in Solov’ëv’s cosmic picture of ideal society, i.e. the Universal Church, can be regarded as a rational argument, but when comprehensively redefined into a discourse having to do with, to speak with Faust, what makes the world one whole [*was die Welt im Inneren zusammenhält*], it turns into a new deterministic dogma concealed by philosophical discourse. Solov’ëv’s theosophy blurs the borderline between philosophy and theology; nonetheless it is as dogmatic as the latter, which is why he and his followers would need to create another new historical Church to start progress.

NOTES

¹ The idea of an “eighth day” to Creation was already propounded by St. Augustine. Cf. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans* (Cambridge UP, 1998), p. 1182.

² Cf. Caputo, *Philosophy*, p. 12.

³ Cf. Frank, *Predmet*, p. 165.

⁴ Frank explicitly refers to St. Augustine’s *Confessions*. See esp. the Augustinian motto to *The Unknowable*, Part II, p. 99. Cf. also, *Predmet*, p. 381, and cf. *Reality*, p. 20. At many places Frank reasons about the fundamental premises to “*cogito, ergo sum*” versus “*sum, ergo cogito*.” In *Life*, 83f, the British biographer Boobbyer describes the fundamental “philosophical revelation” Frank had in 1913: he reported to his son Victor: “I had reached a certain boundary and got into a dead end. I gave up writing and wandered around the room thinking for a whole week. Then there was a flowing of blood to the head, and I decided to leave everything and rest. And then in the night a voice said to me: ‘Can’t you understand a simple thing? Why start from consciousness? Start from being!’” The son answered: “*Sum, ergo cogito*,” and Frank replied: “No, rather, *cogito, ergo est esse absolutum*.”

⁵ Cusanus’ *Docta Ignorantia*, his formula of “wise ignorance” and/or “coincidence of opposites” wholly determines especially Frank’s cognitive method. He agrees with Hegel that negation “... is the universal instrument

of knowledge” and bears “enormous power.” The introductory remarks to *The Unknowable* clarify that Frank uses Cusanus’ *Docta* in looking at “... three strata or spheres of being:” first, the surrounding world, which “... is present before us as *objective being*” [equated with concreteness, viz. phenomena; KB] which Frank explores “... in its roots and foundations.” Secondly, he looks at the individual’s being “... as it is revealed” in terms of “inner life” relating it as much “... to the inner life of other people” as to “... the more profound, spiritual ground of our psychic life.” Last but not least, Frank investigates that “... stratum or sphere of reality which, as the primordial ground and total unity, somehow unifies and grounds the diverse, heterogeneous worlds of 1 and 2.” Cf. Frank, *The Unknowable*, p. xxii.

⁶ Cf. Bulgakov, *Predislovie to Ot marksizma*, pp. V–XXI.

⁷ Cf. idem, *Philosophy*, p. 88 passim. Schelling is extensively quoted in Bulgakov’s *Philosophy*, esp.: (1.) System des transzendentalen Idealismus, *Ausgew. Werke*, II., (2.) Ideen zur Philosophie der Natur, A. W., I., (3.) Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der höheren Physik zu Erklärung des allgemeinen Organismus, 1798, A. W., I., (4.) Philosophie der Kunst, A. W. III., Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Philosophie, A. W., I., (5.) Die allgemeine Deduction des dynamischen Prozesses, A. W., I., Einleitung zu dem Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie, A. W., I., (6.) Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus, A. W., II., (7.) Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, A. W., III., (8.) Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, *Ausgew. Werke*, I, in: *Werke, Auswahl in drei Bänden*, Herausgegeben von Otto Weiss, Leipzig 1907.

The idea of “identity” reappears by the notion of “religious materialism” defining nature the “second Absolute;” cf. Bulgakov, *Priroda*, 8–20. The contemporary Russian philosopher Khoružij decides “religious materialism” as to predicate Bulgakov’s “worldview,” directed at the “world’s justification.” Cf. Khoružij, *Sofija*, pp. 76–79. See also, Bulgakov, *Filosofija*, p. 51: about “religious materialism” as a suitable title to Solov’ev’s Christian ontology that continued the thought of Athanasius of Alexandria, Gregorius of Nyssa and other patristic Fathers. Evtuhov translates *religioznyj materialism* to “Christian materialism;” cf., *Philosophy*, p. 38, although by footnote Bulgakov explicitly refers to Solov’ev as having coined this particular expression. In this context see especially footnote no. 17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 85, quote from Schelling’s *Ideen zur Philosophie der Natur*, *Ausgewählte Werke*, I, p. 152.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁰ Cf. Bulgakov, *Priroda*, p. 19.

¹¹ Cf. Kochetkova, *Theory*, p. 1 passim.

¹² Cf. Bulgakov, *Sophia*, pp. 33–35, and cf. Bulgakov, *Ipostas’*, pp. 28ff.

¹³ Cf. *ibid.* and many other places. Cf. Solov’ev, *La Russie*, pp. 240ff and passim.

¹⁴ Cf. Bulgakov, *Glavy*, p. 54f. For an account of Bulgakov’s ontological views, cf. Breckner, *Review of Bulgakov, Trudy*, pp. 237–239.

- ¹⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 59–62.
- ¹⁶ Cf. Bulgakov, *Philosophy*, pp. 204f.
- ¹⁷ Cf. Solov'ëv, *Evrejsvo*, pp. 142–150.
- ¹⁸ Cf. *idem*, *Opravdanie*, pp. 728–758.
- ¹⁹ Cf. Kochetkova, *Theory*, p. 166.
- ²⁰ Cf. Solov'ëv, *Istorija*, p. 267; see also, *Evrejsvo*, p. 587, and *passim*.
- ²¹ Cf. *idem*, *Russie*, p. 269.
- ²² Cf. *idem*, *Istorija*, pp. 574–579.
- ²³ Cf. *idem*, *Russie*, pp. 280ff.
- ²⁴ Cf. *idem*, *Velikij spor*, p. 4, and *passim*.
- ²⁵ Cf. *idem*, *Russie*, p. 294.
- ²⁶ Cf. Strémoukhoff, *Vladimir Soloviev*, 145, first footnote on this page about the little biblical influence of St. Augustine, for whom the seventh day is yet to come where as in Solov'ëv it is the eighth that is awaited beyond time and space.
- ²⁷ Cf. Solov'ëv. *Istorija*, pp. 574–579.
- ²⁸ Cf. *idem*, *La Russie*, pp. 245ff; esp. p. 269.
- ²⁹ Cf. *idem*, *Iz filosofii*, p. 357, and *passim*.
- ³⁰ Cf. Bulgakov, *Philosophy*, pp. 103f, and cf. *Church*, p. 168.
- ³¹ Cf. *idem*, *Philosophy*, p. 149, see the first footnote on this page. Cf. also Bulgakov's homage to Fëdorov, *myslitel'*, pp. 322–331, and cf. *Svet*, pp. 315f: about the latter's vision of reanimating the dead.
- ³² Cf. *idem*, *Teaching*, p. 20.
- ³³ Cf. *ibid.* pp. 15ff.
- ³⁴ Cf. *idem*, *Church*, pp. 69, and *passim*.
- ³⁵ Cf. Davy, *L'homme*, p. 172. Cf. also Berdiaev, *idea*, pp. 23f on *jurodstvo* [folly in Christ].
- ³⁶ Cf. Lowrie, *Prophet*, p. 259.
- ³⁷ Cf. Gaith., *Berdiaeff*, p. 20. Cf. Berdjaev himself, *Samopoznanie*, pp. 123f and pp. 147f, for details of his encounter with Bulgakov and his turn from Marxism to idealism, and finally to Russian Orthodoxy.
- ³⁸ Cf. Herberg, *Theologians*, pp. 103–107.
- ³⁹ Cf. Berdjaev, *Slavery*, pp. 59–72.
- ⁴⁰ Cf. Calian, *Significance*, p. 105.
- ⁴¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 20–58, and *passim*.
- ⁴² Cf. McLachlan, *Desire*, pp. 153–190, on the “theandric myth” in Berdjaev.
- ⁴³ Cf. Berdjaev, *Slavery*, pp. 177f.
- ⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ Cf. Breckner, *Solov'ëv*, pp. 477ff.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. Berdjaev, *Philosophie*, pp. 375f.
- ⁴⁷ Cf. *idem*, *Sud'ba*, pp. 14ff.
- ⁴⁸ Cf. *idem*, *Personalizm*, pp. 10ff.
- ⁴⁹ Cf. Gottlieb, *Response*, pp. 124f.
- ⁵⁰ Cf. Berdjaev, *Teokratija*, pp. 250–286.

⁵¹ Cf. *idem*, *Problema*, p. 278. Cf. Breckner, *Sozialismusidee*, pp. 153ff: about Berdjaev's notion of "personalist socialism."

⁵² Cf. *idem*, *Philosophie*, p. 376. Cf. also, *Christentum*, p. 108, and *passim*.

⁵³ Cf. Lowrie, *Existentialism*, p. 145, quoting Berdjaev on "*Freedom of the Eighth Day*." Cf. also Berdjaev, *Slavery*, pp. 216, and *passim*.

⁵⁴ Cf. Frank, *Foundations*, p. 8.

⁵⁵ Cf. *idem*, *O prirode*, pp. 224–233.

⁵⁶ Cf. *idem*, *Duša*, p. 445.

⁵⁷ Cf. *idem*, *O prirode*, pp. 231–233. Cf. also *Reality*, pp. 153–160.

⁵⁸ Cf. *idem*, *Reality*, p. 82.

⁵⁹ Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, pp. 111, 135.

⁶⁰ Cf. *idem*, *Reality*, pp. 156f.

⁶¹ Cf. *idem*, *Metaphysik*, p. 373.

⁶² Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, p. 126.

⁶³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 76.

⁶⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 78.

⁶⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 87.

⁶⁶ Cf. *idem*, *Reality*, p. xv: Frank enthrones Cusanus' *Docta Ignorantia* to be the "source" of all his ideas concerning the "super-rational essence of reality." Cf. also *O nevozmožnosti filosofii*, p. 93: about his endeavor to "... philosophically overcome abstract reasoning" with the help of this law. There are many passages throughout Frank's works confirming this self-given task. Cf. for ex., *Light*, p. 47: as "... all reality is something greater and other than all that we know about it (...) the makeup of rational knowledge necessarily includes knowledge of the limitation and inadequacy of rational knowledge."

⁶⁷ Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, pp. 66f.

⁶⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 106.

⁶⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 102.

⁷⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 118.

⁷¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 159.

⁷² Cf. Frank, *Unknowable*, p. 122: about "inward" and "outward transcendence" as the two forms of real transcendence.

⁷³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 148.

⁷⁴ Cf. *idem*, *Reality*, p. 67 and cf. *Light* pp. 148–152.

⁷⁵ Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, p. 106.

⁷⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 54–67.

⁷⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 109.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁷⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 153.

⁸⁰ Cf. *idem*, *Light*, pp. 208–221: about "faithfulness to the past," detailing his ideas on "conservatism."

⁸¹ Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, p. 160.

⁸² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 148f.

⁸³ Cf. footnote no. 81.

⁸⁴ Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, p. 159.

⁸⁵ Cf. Boobbyer, *Democracy*, p. 208: about Frank's reflections on this idea "... only in their infancy in 1917 and 1918." This is where Boobbyer's investigation ends. Even though I did not discover this notion in any of Frank's later writings, I use it as signifying the credo to Frank's social philosophy.

⁸⁶ Cf. Frank, *Foundations*, pp. 204–208. For the differentiation between forms of democracy, cf. Gutman, *Democracy*, pp. 411–422.

⁸⁷ Cf. Goerdts, *Frank*, p. 647f. Cf. also Motrošilova, *Značenie*, pp. 188f: both about Frank's unrealised plan.

Cf. Frank himself, *Preface, Foundations*, p. I: he reports that his plan to compose a trilogy was "... disrupted (...) by external circumstances connected with Russia's tragedy." Cf. also, *idem*, *Duša*, pp. 419f.

⁸⁸ Cf. Frank, *Metaphysik*, p. 373.

⁸⁹ Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, pp. 111f. The Church paraphrased as "soul" perfectly corresponds to the soul's character, for both stand midway between Spirit and the creaturely world.

⁹⁰ Frank's *The Light Shineth in the Darkness* comprehensively discusses Christian Realism as an attitude that is aware of the world's imperfection and does not allow any sort of linear decision-making. Realism strictly forbids every type of ideological approach.

⁹¹ Cf. *idem*, *Light*, p. 220.

⁹² Cf. *idem*, *Pis'mo*, p. 95.

⁹³ Cf. *idem*, *Foundations*, p. 112.

⁹⁴ Cf. Copleston, *Philosophy*, p. 78.

⁹⁵ Cf. Frank, *Light*, p. 208.

⁹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 222.

⁹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 211.

⁹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 235.

⁹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Boobbyer, *Life*, p. 206.

¹⁰² Cf. Frank, *Light*, p. 226.

¹⁰³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 220.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Kennedy, *Destutt de Tracy*, pp. 59ff

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Clarke, *Church*, p. 239.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Frank, *O nacionalizme*, pp. 107f.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *idem*, *Kniga*, p. 387. Cf. also, *idem*, *Ponjatje*, pp. 119f.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *idem*, *Unknowable*, pp. i–xiii.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Berdjaev, *Christianity*, p. I.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Frank, *O nacionalizme*, p. 108. Cf. also *Kniga*, pp. 387f, about Solov'ev ranking philosophically as highly as Plato.

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KATHARINA BRECKNER

Lessers Passage 4,

Hamburg, 22767,

Germany

E-mail: katharina.breckner@gmx.de